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Executive Summary
1. The world is increasingly faced with a set 
of global problems and challenges that trans-
cend national boundaries and that are threa-
tening the whole of humanity as well as the 
planetary biosphere. These global problems 
and challenges are on the one hand related 
to the globalisation of human activities and on 
the other hand to human impact on the en-
vironment. Both the globalisation and anthro-
pogenic challenges pose serious governance 
problems for the multilateral system.
2. The first problem is that the state-driven 
nature of governance is giving ample room for 
global governance. While global problems by 
definition require global solutions, the policy 
authority remains largely in the hands of states.
3. The second problem is that coping with glo-
bal problems requires a deep understanding 
of the issues at stake. The relationship be-
tween scientific knowledge and policy-making 
is, however, not obvious as states try to keep 
as much control as possible over policy-making 
processes.
4. Both of the aforementioned problems may 
be related to the way in which the current mul-
tilateral system is organised.
5. However, there is on-going shift towards a 
new Multilateralism Mode 2.0 where states 
allow other actors more and more involve-
ment in global policy-making. This gives S&T 
more opportunities for input in the process of 
dealing with current global problems. Despite 
this, the science-policy nexus at a global level 
needs to be strengthened. One way to do this 
is by developing a new form of science diplo-
macy that is not driven by states but rather by 
the scientific community itself as well as by 
the multilateral system.
6. The main conclusion of this paper is that 
there is therefore a need to develop a global 
science diplomacy agenda, consisting of three 
components: a Science in Global Diplomacy 
initiative aimed at mobilising the science and 
technology (S&T) community to carry out re-
search that is relevant for global problems; 
a Diplomacy for Global Science initiative 
aimed at facilitating scientific collaborations 
for dealing with global problems; and a Global 
Science for Global Diplomacy initiative aimed 
at developing the institutional nexus between 
the S&T community and the realm of policy-
making at a global level.
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The world today is faced with a growing set 
of so-called global problems and challenges 
that require global actions. The first set of 
these problems is related to the anthropoge-
nic challenges in the environment. Humanity 
has now such a powerful and often negati-
ve impact on the planet that geologists have 
started to call the present geological era in 
which we live the Anthropocene of the ‘Hu-
man Age’ (Ackerman, 2014). Climate change 
and the warming of the planet is the most 
prominent and troubling effect of the influence 
of humanity on its environment. A second 
set of problems is linked to the accelerated 
development of information and communica-
tion technologies that, combined with increa-
sed transportation facilities, are resulting in 
different kinds of globalisation challenges 
that amongst other things make borders for 
governance increasingly more irrelevant. The 
irreversible trends of the anthropogenic im-
pact on the planet and of the globalisation 
and growing inter-connectivity of human ac-
tivities on the planet result in both threats 
and opportunities. Among the threats are glo-
bal warming, biodiversity preservation, the 
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spreading of pandemic infectious diseases, 
migration, refugees and terrorism. But there 
may also be opportunities, such as economic 
growth, poverty reduction and increased re-
silience to natural risks.
Global climate change is perhaps the most 
exemplary illustration of the issues at stake. 
It took a while before it was understood that 
there is a relation between climate change 
and the atmospheric accumulations of car-
bon dioxide and ‘greenhouse gases’ such as 
methane. And with this came the insight that 
the planet has a single climate system that 
does not recognise the borders between sta-
tes. It does not make a difference where on 
the planet the greenhouse gases are emitted, 
the only thing that matters for global warming 
is their cumulative effect, regardless of their 
origin. This makes it difficult for states to deal 
with the problem, because in order to see any 
effect of a single state policy towards green-
house gases, all other states need to go along 
as well. 
Coping with these challenges requires 
two things: (i) a deep understanding of the 
problems in order to generate ideas about 
possible solutions and (ii) policy actions by 
different governance actors at both local 
and global level. The much-needed deep un-
derstanding implies the mobilisation of S&T 
towards global problems and the translation 
of their input into governance practices and 
goals. The equally needed policy actions imply 
a governance structure that moves away from 
the traditional Westphalian model where sove-
reign states are in the driving seat when dea-
ling with global problems. Global governance 
is needed to deal with threats and unleash 
opportunities. 
There are thus two sets of problems rela-
ted to the present ‘condition humaine’. On the 
one hand, the current state-centred structu-
re of governance is not fit to deal with global 
problems. On the other hand, global problems 
require scientific evidence both in order to un-
derstand them as well as to cope with them. 
Enhancing the capacity of humanity to deal 
Introduction: what is the problem? 
Global problems require scientific
evidence both in order to
understand them as well as to cope
with them.
with global problems needs therefore two in-
novations. First, global governance needs to 
change, as it needs to move away from a state- 
centred approach where sovereignty blocks 
effective actions. Secondly, it needs more 
input from S&T to develop policies that deal 
effectively with global problems.
This paper argues that the S&T commu-
nity has not only the potential to contribute 
significantly on how to deal with global pro-
blems, but that it can also act as a change 
agent towards establishing a global governan-
ce structure that is fit for purpose. In order to 
do so, new forms of science diplomacy need 
to be developed in order to strengthen the 
policy-science nexus at different levels of go-
vernance. The argument will be developed in 
four steps. First, in Section One, a critical as-
sessment will be made of the present structu-
re of global governance that is based upon the 
primary role of sovereign states in a basically 
intergovernmental multilateral system. It will 
be argued that there is a need for a new take 
on multilateralism and that there are signs 
that such a new multilateralism, which can be 
labelled ‘multilateralism mode 2.0’, is in the 
making.
 Section Two will illustrate this claim by 
presenting an overview of how the S&T com-
munity is presently involved in dealing with a 
number of global challenges. The role of S&T 
in the UN endeavour to reach the so-called 
Sustainable Development Goals through the 
Agenda 2030 will be especially highlighted.
In Section Three it will be argued that in 
order to fully unleash the potential of S&T to 
help deal with global problems in the context 
of an appropriate global governance structure, 
the praxis of science diplomacy needs to be 
further developed. This entails a moving away 
from a state-interest driven science diplomacy 
towards a ‘global commons’ driven science 
diplomacy.
Finally, the concluding Section Four will out-
line the aspects of a Global science diplomacy 
agenda that aims to develop a better multila-
teral response to urgent global problems.
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Ever since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, 
governance has been the almost exclusive 
preserve of sovereign states, and indeed, the 
modern state as we know it today achieves in 
many countries remarkable things for its citi-
zens, such as the provision of public goods in 
areas of security and social welfare (health, 
education, etc.) as well as the stimulation of 
economic prosperity. But the ascent of state 
governance has also led to great inequalities 
between states and to inter-state conflicts. 
The latter has everything to do with the way 
states deal with international conflicts and 
international cooperation. The very essence 
of the notion of sovereignty is that states in 
principle do not accept a higher authority. As 
such, the governance space above the level 
of states is limited, which has prompted scho-
lars of International Relations to describe the 
supra-national level as a state of anarchy. States 
fight and compete with each other, but they 
also have to work together. To do this, a set 
of international regimes and international (or 
intergovernmental) organisations have been 
designed. Today, there exists an international 
system that is accepted (within certain limits) 
by a majority of the existing states. This sys-
tem is often called the multilateral system and 
it comprises institutions dealing with peace 
and security, basically the UN and its Security 
Council, as well as institutions and regimes 
dealing with economic and financial governan-
ce (the so-called Bretton Woods system).
Multilateralism was thus initially created as 
a form of cooperation between states that ins-
titutionalises intergovernmental cooperation 
in order to replace anarchy. In such classical 
multilateralism or “Multilateralism Mode 1.0”, 
states are the principal actors in the interstate 
realm of international relations. They are the 
building blocks of multilateralism. National 
governments are therefore the “star players” 
and intergovernmental organisations, such as 
the UN or the World Bank, are only dependent 
agents whose degree of freedom only goes as 
far as the states allow them to go. The pri-
macy of sovereignty is the ultimate principle 
of international relations. In this sense, it is 
a closed system dominated by states. Gover-
nance is delivered in a hierarchical (bottom-
up or top-down) way, following the principle of 
subsidiarity. This means that in general there 
is a reluctance by states to hand over some 
of its powers to a higher authority such as the 
UN. Consequently, the power of the UN for glo-
bal governance is therefore limited to how far 
states are willing to go.
This multilateralism 1.0 is clearly facing 
challenges in the 21st century. More than a 
reflection of the failure of the concept, this is a 
sign of a changing international context, which 
has rendered anachronistic the traditional in-
tergovernmental multilateralism of the imme-
diate Post-World War Two era. This changing 
context consists of many aspects. Amongst 
them are the anthropogenic changes in the 
environment that have global consequences. 
Take climate change: there is overwhelming 
evidence that it is induced by man-made acti-
vities, which implies that it is possible to re-
verse the trend if the right policies are put in 
place. But no single state can combat climate 
change on its own. Moreover, if a single state 
decided to take drastic measures to stop the 
emission of greenhouse gases for instance, if 
other states did not act in the same way, that 
particular state would risk being economically 
outcompeted. Another major change has been 
induced by the development of information and 
communication technologies that have signi-
ficantly lowered the salience of borders and 
stimulated worldwide flows of goods and infor-
mation. As a result, the national economies of 
the sovereign states have become very inter-
connected. The financial crisis of 2008 is just 
one dramatic illustration of this trend: what 
started as a sub-prime housing crisis in the 
US resulted in a sovereign bond crisis in Euro-
pe. And finally, states have to share their mo-
nopoly of governance increasingly with gover-
nance units at both the sub-national regional 
level and the supra-national level such as the 
EU (Van Langenhove, 2011). This has resulted 
in complex governance landscape where sta-
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1. The need for a Multilateralism 2.0
tes find it more and more difficult to keep their 
positions as sovereign ‘star players’.
All of this also puts a lot of stress on the 
existing multilateral system that was designed 
after the Second World War. The aforementio-
ned global problems are especially challenging 
because “the policy authority for tackling glo-
bal problems still belongs to the states, while 
the sources of the problems and potential so-
lutions are situated at transnational, regional 
or global level” (Thakur and Van Langenhove, 
2006, p. 223). But there are signs that mul-
tilateralism is undergoing a transformation 
from mode 1.0 to mode 2.0. A Multilateralism 
2.0 that is more open instead of closed, more 
networked than hierarchical and less state-
centric (Van Langenhove, 2010).
A first sign of this move towards Multilate-
ralism 2.0 is the growing diversification of mul-
tilateral organisations. In recent years, there 
has been a dramatic rise of all kinds of interna-
tional organisations and regimes. The number 
of intergovernmental organisations has grown 
from 37 to well over 400 in the period be- 
tween 1990 and 2000. While mostly operating 
on an inter-governmental basis, some of them 
have acquired quite a lot of autonomy in the 
exercise of their competences or even have 
a “legal personality”, just as states do. And 
increasingly, these organisations look more to 
networks than to formal (bureaucratic) organi-
sations. In line with a “transnationalisation of 
policies”, one can state that Multilateralism 
2.0 embodies the rise of transnational policy 
networks (Stone, 2013).
Secondly, there is the growing importance 
of non-state governance actors. Here, regions 
play an important role. States have nowadays 
created a large number of so-called regional 
institutions that have themselves become pla-
yers in the international order. Such regional 
organisations exist at both the supra-national 
and sub-national level. This is related to the phe-
nomena of integration and devolution where- 
by national powers are in some states trans-
ferred to either supra-national or sub-national 
regions. The European Union is perhaps the 
most typical example at the supra-national le-
vel: it is not a state, but it has a lot of state- 
hood properties with the European Commis-
sion and European Council as its executive 
power, the European Parliament as its legisla-
tive power and the European Court of Justice 
as its legal power. Not being a state, the EU 
is not entitled to be a member of the United 
Nations, but it has been granted an enhan-
ced observer status with the right to speak at 
the UN General Assembly. The same holds for 
many sub-national regions. A typical example 
would be the Belgian region of Flanders. Again, 
it is not a state, but it has its own parliament 
and government. And Flanders has the power 
to engage in bilateral agreements with states. 
Some of these subnational regional entities 
even have growing ambitions to be present 
on the international stage as well. Therefore, 
some of these new players, although not sta-
tes, do strongly resemble states and increa-
singly act on the global stage as if they were 
states. As a result, we are currently witness-
ing a transition from a world of states to a 
world of states and regions (Van Langenhove, 
2011). While states still hold the policy au-
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The multilateral system comprises
institutions dealing with peace and
security, basically the UN and its
Security Council, as well as
institutions and regimes dealing
with economic and financial
governan ce.
Australia, and at the sub-national level, Bel-
gian regions, Austrian and German Länder and 
Spanish comunidades autónomas.
Thirdly, along with the increased relations 
between ‘vertical’ levels of governance, there 
is a growing horizontal interconnectivity be-
tween policy domains. We can see increased 
interconnections between policy domains: fi-
nance cannot be divorced from trade, securi-
ty, climate, etc. A distinctive characteristic of 
Multilateralism 2.0 is therefore that the boun-
daries between policy domains are becoming 
more and more permeable. Instead of clearly 
separated areas of policy concern treated wi-
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thority for dealing with global issues, the po-
tential solutions to the challenges of globali-
sation are more and more often developed at 
a transnational, regional or institutional level. 
As a result, sub-and supra-national represen-
tation arises when a system needs to have 
a level of problem solving and a stabilisation 
capacity that is adequate to deal with the pro-
blems that are likely to be generated in pur-
suing agreed integration objectives of a cer-
tain level of ambition. Typical examples are: at 
the supra-national level, the European Union, 
the African Union, MERCOSUR or ASEAN, or 
even federations of states such as the US or 
thin separate institutions, there are now grou-
pings of different actors and layers that toge-
ther form global epistemic communities. 
Fourthly, in Multilateralism 2.0, the system 
is more open to civil society. This is perhaps 
the most revolutionary aspect of Multilatera-
lism 2.0, but also the most difficult one to 
organise. This is related to the state-centric 
and institutional focus of classical multila-
teral organisations where there was hardly 
any room for open debate, let alone for the 
involvement of citizens. But there is evidence 
that an alternative is emerging, that of mul-
tilateral institutions functioning not so much 
as an organisation, but rather as an agora, 
that is a public realm in which issues can be 
debated and perhaps, be decided. As mentio-
ned before, sovereign states are thus not the 
only actors that play a role in the world: on 
the contrary, the system becomes much more 
open, coming to include states, regional or-
ganisations, sub-and supra-national regions, 
NGOs and civil society. These actors may even 
challenge the notion of sovereignty. What was 
once an exclusive playing ground has now be-
come a space that states have to share with 
others. This system is increasingly becoming 
participatory. Governance is exerted in con-
cert by the various levels involved.
Finally, we can also point to emerging new 
modes of diplomacy: Multilateral diplomacy 
has undergone a substantial expansion in re-
cent decades. Originally, diplomacy was seen 
as a system of representation and communi-
cation between states at a bilateral or multi-
lateral level (Pigman, 2010, p. 5). Such diplo-
macy was driven by the self-interest of states 
in the areas of trade and security. As the 
global agenda has widened to include issues 
far beyond the traditional politico-security and 
economic spheres, and the borders between 
foreign and domestic policy have been chal-
lenged, diplomacy has gradually been broade-
ned to include cultural diplomacy for instance. 
In this context, new actors and networks (bu-
siness actors, NGOs, civil society organisa-
tions) have increased in influence –supported 
by the development of new technologies. With 
the Internet and the social media, they enter 
Many other non-state actors are
also knocking on the doors of the
multilateral system, amongst them
scientific organisations.
into the blogosphere, and represent them- 
selves to others –known and unknown– in 
other parts of the world. 
The metaphor Multilateralism 2.0 aims 
to capture this transformation and gives a 
strong conceptual basis to understand these 
new developments, including the emergence 
of international networks, and the definition 
of multilateralism as an open system rather 
than closed in the context of international 
relations. The concept of Multilateralism 2.0 
also seizes on the fact that the Westphalian 
model of governance is questioned by other 
non-state actors that are challenging the pri-
macy of sovereignty (this was the primary 
principle constraining Intergovernmental or-
ganisations). This is especially the case for 
supra-national regional organisations and sub-
national entities that both have multilateral 
ambitions and behave in a similar way to the 
states that created them. But many other non-
state actors are also knocking on the doors 
of the multilateral system, amongst them 
scientific organisations.
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The on-going transformation from Multilate-
ralism 1.0 to Multilateralism 2.0 is well illus-
trated by how the S&T community in recent 
decades has become increasingly involved, 
firstly in several multilateral environmental 
agreements and then in other global problems 
as well. Two intertwined developments oc- 
curred: on the one hand the multilateral sys-
tem gradually opened up to the participation 
of the S&T community. On the other hand, the 
S&T community organised itself in order to 
maximise its participative power in the global 
governance system.
Early developments
As early as the late 1960s and early 1970s 
there was a significant amount of scientific 
evidence available that pointed towards an-
thropogenic climate change. The increase of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere was 
especially well monitored and modelled. In-
ternational science organisations such as 
the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) 
and the International Council of Scientific 
Unions (ICSU) started to launch programmes 
to expand data gathering. One of the first 
was the WMO/ICSU joint ‘Global Atmospheric 
Research Programme’ that was launched in 
1967. By 1985 they announced an interna-
tional consensus that there would be a rise 
in the global average temperature between 
2000 and 2050. That same year the Bri-
tish Antarctic Survey of ozone in the upper 
atmosphere revealed the existence of an 
‘ozone hole’ that was linked to the emittance 
of chlorofluorocarbon, the so-called CFC ga-
ses, used in spray cans and refrigerators. In 
1987 this led to an international treaty, the 
Montreal protocol, which eventually led to the 
phasing out of CFCs. Today all UN member 
states have ratified the Montreal Protocol and 
it is regarded as perhaps the most successful 
international agreement to date. It also de-
monstrates how the UN multilateral system 
could reach a consensus on a global policy 
with the help of the S&T community. 
Meanwhile, in 1988 the WMO and other 
UN agencies set up the Intergovernmental Pa-
nel on Climate Change (IPCC) as a multilateral 
tool to both generate scientific consensus and 
translate them into suitable policy recommen-
dations. The IPCC currently has 194 member 
states. It is conceived as a UN body with re-
porting responsibilities to the WMO, the Uni-
ted Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) and the UN General Assem-
bly. It is however said that the IPCC acts more 
independently than its legal status suggests 
(Bernhardt, 2012, p. 5). The establishment of 
the IPCC within the UN framework was not an 
easy achievement and the form it took was 
the result of a compromise between the UN 
and its member states. Governments were gi-
ven the right to set the agenda and own the 
process. Scientists are involved as actors who 
ensure credibility. But it is governments that 
nominate experts, approve the outline of the 
reports and review the drafts of the Synthesis 
Report. In practice this has resulted in long 
discussions and negotiations between the 
scientists/lead authors and government offi-
cials concerning the wording of each of the 
reports to be released.
The innovative aspect of the IPCC is that 
it carries characteristics of both a scientific 
and intergovernmental organisation. This hy-
brid situation is a consequence of the defi-
ned purpose of the IPCC, namely to prepare, 
based on available scientific information, a 
report on all aspects of climate change and 
its impacts, with a view to formulating realis-
tic response strategies. Although it does not 
conduct research itself but only collects and 
reviews existing scientific knowledge, it can 
be considered as a scientific body as it invol-
ves thousands of scientists who take part in 
the data analysis process, which is fairly com-
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2. The crucial role of S&T 
in dealing with global problems
prehensive. At the same time, it also acts as 
an intergovernmental body, because govern-
ment representatives play a crucial role in 
the decision-making processes. As a result, 
the IPCC has a rather complex structure that 
illustrates that bridging science and politics 
is not an easy thing (Bernhardt, 2015). The 
most important bodies of the IPCC are the 
Panel, the Bureau, the Working Groups (WG), 
the Task Force on National Greenhouse Gas 
Inventories, the Technical Support Units and 
the Secretariat. In the Panel, government re-
presentatives from all member states meet 
together with hundreds of experts. It is here 
that the most important decisions regarding 
the IPCC process are made. The Bureau 
brings together all the Chairs, co-chairs and 
vice-chairs of the different organs, advises 
the Panel on both the scientific and technolo-
gical matters and on managerial and strategy 
issues. Funding comes primarily from regular 
contributions by the WMO, the UNEP and the 
UNFCCC, topped up with voluntary contribu-
tions from member states. It is in the Panel 
that government representatives meet and 
make final decisions. The Working Groups 
constitute the scientific core of the IPCC 
system. Working Group I covers the physical 
science basis of climate change; Working 
Group II deals with climate change impacts, 
adaptation and vulnerability; and Working 
Group III collects and evaluates information 
related to the reduction of climate change. 
There is also a Task Force on National Green-
house Gas Inventories (TF1), a Task Group 
on Data and Scenario Support for Impacts 
and Climate Analysis (TGICA) and several 
other task forces or steering groups related 
to the investigation of specific problems and 
questions. For each Working Group and for 
the TF1, a Technical Support Unit (TSU) faci-
litates the respective body’s activities. These 
TSUs are hosted and financed by the govern-
ments of one of the WG members. And then 
there is also a secretariat hosted by the WMO 
in Geneva that plans, oversees and manages 
all IPCC activities.
The First IPCC Assessment Report was pu-
blished in 1990, and a second report followed 
in 1995. The first report played an important 
role at the Rio Summit in 1992 where the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) was agreed upon. The second in-
formed the negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol 
in 1997. In 2001, 2007 and 2015 the third, 
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In 1988 the WMO and other UN
agencies set up the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) as a multilateral
tool to both generate scientific
consensus and translate them into
suitable policy recommendations.
fourth and fifth reports followed, each time 
announcing firmer consensus agreements on 
the existence and dangers of global warming. 
But meanwhile, the IPCC also became the 
subject of attacks by industrial lobbyists and 
the agreements reached were only possible 
after diluting the original statements, becau-
se many governments could not agree with 
was proposed out of pure self-interest. Ne-
vertheless, the story of the IPCC is a unique 
development in putting a global problem on 
the agenda for global governance and in orga-
nising dialogue between scientists and policy-
makers. At present, five Assessment Reports 
have been delivered along with a number of 
IPCC Special Reports that are issued in res-
ponse to particular problems or questions. 
The Sixth Assessment Report is expected to 
be finalised in 2022.
The IPCC can be regarded as a clear exam-
ple of how the transition from Multilateralism 
mode 1.0 to mode 2.0 is taking place as it is 
an endeavour that involves states, classical 
multilateral organisations and the S&T com-
munity. The established structure is however 
incredibly complex. This can certainly be re-
lated to the complexity of the issue, but also 
to the positions of the member states who by 
and large aim to stay in control of the whole 
process. The IPCC case also illustrates that 
bringing S&T knowledge to the global policy-
making level is not a straightforward issue.
The broadening and 
institutionalisation of S&T input to 
global governance
Gradually, the conclusions that climate change 
needs to be tackled at a global level and that 
S&T needs to play a crucial role in that pro-
cess, found their way to thinking about other 
areas of global concern, especially to the 
sustainable development agenda. Today, we 
are witnessing a growing presence of S&T in 
the whole UN system, although none of these 
S&T advice systems are as developed and ins-
titutionally sophisticated as the IPCC.
As early as the first UN Conference on 
Environment and Development in 1992, the 
socalled Earth Summit, it was recognised 
that achieving sustainable development is not 
something that can be left to states alone. It 
requires the active participation of all sectors 
of society. The Agenda 21, adopted at the 
Earth Summit, formalised this by identifying 
nine sectors of society as the main channels 
through which such participation needs to be 
realised. This has led to the setting up of ‘the 
Major Groups’ system that since 2002 has 
been used by the UN to organise the inclusion 
of stakeholders in UN processes. They inclu-
de: women, children and young people, indi-
genous people, NGOs, local authorities, wor-
kers and trade unions, business and industry, 
farmers and researchers. The S&T community 
is thus one of these designated groups. Two 
decades after the Earth Summit, the impor-
tance of effectively engaging with these nine 
sectors was reaffirmed at the Rio+20 Confe-
rence in 2012. 
The UNEP also started to use this ‘Major 
Groups’ model in 2004, allowing the ICSU to 
participate in the annual stakeholder forums 
and the UNEP General Conference. It also 
allowed the ICSU to participate in numerous 
conference calls and additional consultation 
meetings that the UNEP holds throughout the 
year as part of its stakeholder coordination 
and outreach strategy. Meanwhile, major 
UN summits on the environment and deve-
lopment have also started using the Major 
Groups system, notably the World Summit 
on Sustainable Development (WSSD) held in 
South Africa in 2002 and the Rio+20 confe-
rence in 2012. 
By installing the Major Groups model of 
participation inside the UN system, the S&T 
community now has the chance to participa-
te directly in UN work alongside governments. 
In practice this means the chance to attend 
meetings, often with a time allotted to make 
statements as well as having the opportuni-
ty to submit written input at key points in the 
processes. In some cases there can even be 
a co-organising mandate.
For the S&T community, this work is mainly 
done by the ICSU. This global body is devo-
ted to international cooperation in the advan-
cement of science. Its members are national 
scientific bodies and international scientific 
unions. Today, it comprises 120 multi-discipli-
nary national scientific members, associates 
and observers representing 140 countries 
and 31 international, disciplinary scientific 
unions. The ICSU also has 22 scientific as-
sociates. The ICSU is one of the oldest non-
governmental organisations in the world and 
represents the evolution and expansion of two 
earlier bodies known as the International As-
sociation of Academies (IAA; 1899-1914) and 
the International Research Council (IRC; 1919-
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1931). The ICSU’s mission is to strength- 
en international science for the benefit of 
society. To do this, the ICSU mobilises the 
knowledge and resources of the international 
science community to:
· Identify and address major issues of im-
portance to science and society.
· Facilitate interaction between scientists 
across all disciplines and from all coun-
tries.
· Promote the participation of all scientists 
–regardless of race, citizenship, language, 
political stance, or gender– in the interna-
tional scientific endeavour.
· Provide independent, authoritative advice 
to stimulate constructive dialogue between 
the scientific community and governments, 
civil society, and the private sector.
Activities focus on three areas: International 
Research Collaboration, Science for Policy, and 
Universality of Science (Greenaway, 2006).
The ICSU works in close partnership with 
the International Social Science Council (ISSC), 
the World Federation of Engineering Organisa-
tions (WFEO). Since the establishment of the 
UN Commission on Sustainable Development 
the ICSU has been acting as a co-organiser 
of the UN Commission on Sustainable Deve-
lopment. Again, this can be seen as an im-
portant step towards the establishment of a 
Mode 2.0 multilateral system as it demonstra-
tes an opening up international organisations 
to non-state actors (Talberg, et al, 2013). And 
it certainly has made the input of S&T to the 
global policy agenda almost mainstream. This 
is illustrated by the fact that a 2014 report by 
the Scientific Advisory Board of the Secretary-
General of the United Nations (UNSG SAB) 
acknowledged that science is critical to help 
meet the challenges for sustainable develo-
pment, as it lays the foundation for new ap- 
proaches, solutions and technologies to iden-
tify, clarify and tackle global challenges for the 
future. The report therefore recommended that 
the transformative power of science needs to 
be anchored prominently in a preamble to the 
Sustainable Development Goals and called 
for a set of well-designed, measurable, policy-
relevant, easy to interpret, baseline-oriented 
and disaggregated indicators. 
The development of a global agenda
Along with the institutionalisation of the par-
ticipation of the S&T community and other 
civil society groups, another development oc-
curred that strengthened the science-policy 
nexus: the idea to work with measurable and 
monitorable targets and goals. In 2000, the 
UN set nine international development goals, 
known as the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDG), which were to be achieved by 2015. 
These goals included the eradication of extre-
me poverty, universal primary education, gen-
der equality, reduced child mortality, improved 
material health, reduced HIV/Aids and other 
diseases, environmental sustainability and 
global partnership for development. A crucial 
aspect of the MDG programme was that it 
tried to reconcile environmental concerns with 
developmental concerns. Today, the results 
of this programme are at best mixed and we 
could say that most of the goals are still works 
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in progress. But it was the first time in history 
that UN member states agreed upon an ambi-
tious global governance project, and it paved 
the way for the direct involvement of the S&T 
community. 
At the Rio+20 conference in 2012, a 
process was launched to develop a strong 
post-2015 development agenda. Part of that 
process resulted in calls for the greater invol-
vement of the S&T community in the setting 
and monitoring of the global goals. In 2013, 
a resolution of the UN General Assembly on 
Science, technology and innovation for develop- 
ment stated that S&T and innovation are “es-
governance issues, such as climate change, 
migration, disaster risk reduction and drugs 
policies. Seventeen Sustainable Development 
Goals have been identified: 
· Goal 1: End poverty in all its forms every-
where 
· Goal 2: End hunger, achieve food security 
and improved nutrition and promote sus-
tainable agriculture 
· Goal 3: Ensure healthy lives and promote 
well-being for all at all ages 
· Goal 4: Ensure inclusive and equitable 
quality education and promote lifelong 
learning opportunities for all 
· Goal 5: Achieve gender equality and em-
power all women and girls 
· Goal 6: Ensure availability and sustaina-
ble management of water and sanitation 
for all 
· Goal 7: Ensure access to affordable, relia-
ble, sustainable and modern energy for all 
· Goal 8: Promote sustained, inclusive 
and sustainable economic growth, full and 
productive employment and decent work 
for all 
· Goal 9: Build resilient infrastructure, pro-
mote inclusive and sustainable industriali-
sation and foster innovation 
· Goal 10: Reduce inequality within and 
among countries 
· Goal 11: Make cities and human settle-
ments inclusive, safe, resilient and sustai-
nable action to combat climate change and 
its impacts
· Goal 12: Ensure sustainable consump-
tion and production patterns
· Goal 13: Take urgent action to combat 
climate change1
1. Interestingly, this is the only Goal that comes with 
an asterix. It states: “Acknowledging that the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
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sential enablers and drivers” for the achieve-
ment of the MDG. S&T have found their way to 
global policy making through the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development. 
There now exists for the first time in his-
tory an over-arching policy agenda for the 
whole UN system; the 2030 Agenda for Sus-
tainable Development (also known as the 
SDGs) as adopted at the United Nations 
Sustainable Development Summit on 25th 
September 2015. The Agenda is a plan of ac-
tion for people, the planet and prosperity. It 
also seeks to strengthen universal peace in 
larger freedom. It deals with many different 
· Goal 14: Conserve and sustainably use 
the oceans, seas and marine resources for 
sustainable development 
· Goal 15: Protect, restore and promote 
sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, 
sustainably manage forests, combat de-
sertification, and halt and reverse land de-
gradation and halt biodiversity loss 
· Goal 16: Promote peaceful and inclusi-
ve societies for sustainable development, 
provide access to justice for all and build 
effective, accountable and inclusive insti-
tutions at all levels 
· Goal 17: Strengthen the means of imple-
mentation and revitalise the global part-
nership for sustainable development 
These Goals cover a wide range of topics, 
from social (such as poverty, education, mi-
gration, etc.), to economic (such as energy, 
production and consumption, jobs etc.), en-
vironmental (such as water, ecosystems, or 
climate change) and the rule of law and gover-
nance (such as combatting corruption, enhanc- 
ing transparency, policy coordination, etc.) 
and have been translated into no less than 
169 targets. And the Agenda not only sets 
out targets and ambitions, it also aspires to 
monitor progress by establishing an indicator 
framework. Thus, the SDGs encourage a focus 
on integrated policy interventions demonstra-
ted to have measurable impact. The ambitions 
of the 2030 Agenda are very high and achie-
ving the set targets will only be possible if the 
UN member states and non-state governance 
actors at all levels from global to local work 
together in collaborative partnerships. In the 
SDGs framework, S&T features strongly both 
in Goal 17, as well as a multi-disciplinary is-
sue to achieve several sectorial goals and 
targets. Moreover the related Addis Ababa 
Action Agenda (AAAA), outcome of the Addis 
Ababa Conference on ‘Financing for Develop-
is the primary international, intergovernmental fo-
rum for negotiating the global response to climate 
change”.
ment’ identified concrete S&T policies and ac-
tions as a key for meeting the SDGs. In parti-
cular, the AAAA recognised that “the creation, 
development and diffusion of new innovations 
and technologies and associated know-how, 
including the transfer of technology on mutua-
lly agreed terms, are powerful drivers of eco-
nomic growth and sustainable development”.2 
The document, which contains an entire chap-
ter on S&T, also stresses that S&T strategies 
need to be integral elements of national sus-
tainable development strategies. Attention 
is drawn to the need to design polices that 
incentivise the creation of new technologies 
and that promote research that supports in-
novation in developing countries as well as to 
the importance of regulatory and governance 
frameworks for nurturing science and innova-
tion, and the dissemination of technologies.
The High-Level Political Forum on Sustai-
nable Development is the UNs central platform 
for the follow-up and review of the 2030 Agen-
da for Sustainable Development and the Sus-
tainable Development Goals. The forum, which 
adopts a Ministerial Declaration, is expected 
to provide political leadership, guidance and 
recommendations on the 2030 Agenda’s im-
plementation and follow-up. It can be regarded 
as the top-level political venue for considering 
the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. This 
means keeping track of the progress of the 
SDGs, promoting consistent policies informed 
by evidence, scientific and national experien-
ces, as well as addressing new and emerging 
issues. The High-Level Political Forum (HLPF) 
met for the first time since the adoption of the 
2030 Agenda on 18th-20th July 2016. On that 
occasion, the first-ever Sustainable Develop-
2. The groundbreaking agreement, the Addis Aba-
ba Action Agenda (AAAA), provides a foundation for 
implementing the global sustainable development 
agenda that world leaders are expected to adopt 
this September. The agreement was reached by the 
193 UN member states attending the Conference, 
following months of negotiations between countries. 
It marks a milestone in forging an enhanced global 
partnership that aims to foster universal, inclusive 
economic prosperity and improve people’s well- 
being while protecting the environment.
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ment Goals tracking report on the new global 
development agenda was launched. Among 
other functions, the HLPF aims to strengthen 
the science-policy interface through a review 
of documentation, bringing together dispersed 
information and assessments. There seems 
to be a desire to make the reviews more ro-
bust and evidence-based. The HLPF aims to 
strengthen the science-policy interface by 
both promoting the provision of policy-relevant 
data and the supporting of enhanced dialogue 
between science and policy-makers. 
The 2030 Agenda adopted in September 
2015 firmly acknowledges the crucial role of 
S&T and formalises its involvement through 
the establishment of initiatives such as the 
Technology Facilitation Mechanism (TFM). 
The first annual multi-stakeholder Forum on 
Science, Technology and Innovation for the 
SDGs (Science Technology and Innovation Fo-
rum) was held on 6th-7th June 2016 in New 
York. The TFM is composed of three parts:
· A UN Interagency Task Team on Science, 
Technology and Innovation for the SDGs 
that promotes coordination, consistency 
and cooperation within the UN system on 
S&T related matters with the goal of en-
hancing synergy and efficiency. The task 
team includes representatives from the 
scientific community, the private sector 
and civil society.
· A collaborative Forum on Science, Tech-
nology and Innovation (STI) for the SDGs 
that will be convened once a year to dis-
cuss S&T cooperation around thematic 
areas for the implementation of the SDGs. 
The Forum brings together all relevant 
stakeholders and will produce input for the 
HLPF.
· An Online Platform for Technology Knowled-
ge and Information Sharing (OPTKIS) that 
will be used for a comprehensive map-
ping of existing S&T initiatives as well as 
for the development of independent tech- 
nical assessments of best practices.
Therefore, there are now high expectations 
regarding the involvement of the worldwide 
scientific community in achieving the 2030 
Agenda. In an editorial published in Science, 
William Colglazier (2015) rightly pointed to the 
fact that Agenda 2030 provides a unique op-
portunity for a continued interaction between 
scientists and policy makers at a global level. 
According to Colglazier, science’s contribu-
tions to the SDGs could be fourfold:
· science could inform our understanding 
of the challenges that these goals may 
come up against;
· science could help policy-makers to se-
lect those actions that will actually make a 
difference towards achieving their goals;
· science could be a critical tool in moni-
toring the progress made towards these 
goals; and
· science could provide insight into inno-
vative solutions needed to achieve these 
goals.
Being one of the nine Major Groups, the 
S&T community has been granted comprehen-
sive participatory opportunities in the HLPF 
through UN General Assembly Resolution 
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A/RES/67/290. Since then, the Scientific and 
Technological Community (STC) Major Group, 
has been working on providing governments, 
policy-makers and larger society with a better 
understanding of what is scientifically and tech- 
nologically achievable based upon what we 
know and what we can do with the knowledge 
and the technological tools available or under 
development. 
The present Agenda 2030 for sustainable 
development provides an unprecedented op-
portunity to increase the global governance 
capacity of the world and scientists can play a 
major role in that by both providing data and 
evidence that identifies the challenges, provi-
ding advice on the policy actions needed and 
helping to find innovative solutions. Moreover, 
science can also contribute to the monitoring 
of how global problems are dealt with. Indeed, 
the 2030 Agenda opens up major new oppor-
tunities for researchers not only for delivering 
input but also for increasing impact.
As noted by Colglazier (2015), the world’s 
science communities should view the 2030 
Agenda as a great opportunity for strength-
ening the UN science-policy interface to benefit 
everyone in the world. Colglazier, who beca-
me science and technology advisor to the US 
Secretary of State in 2011, sees two specific 
opportunities. First there is the chance that 
the science community has to deliver input to 
the Global Sustainable Development Reports 
(GSDRs). This UN initiative foresees between 
now and 2030 a series of four-year cycles of 
reporting where there will be three annual re-
ports that focus on special issues followed by a 
comprehensive report in the fourth year. In the 
2016 report there will be room to include input 
from the scientific community. The Technology 
Facilitation Mechanism (TMF) as created by the 
2030 Agenda offers a second opportunity. The 
UN Secretary-General has created a group of 
high-level people representing science and civil 
society to work with the UN agencies on the role 
of STI for achieving the SDGs. The TFM conve-
nes an annual STI forum of which the first took 
place in June 2016. The results of that forum 
have been discussed at the July 2016 meeting 
of the High-Level Political Forum, the highest 
UN body dealing with the 2030 agenda.
Therefore, we are on the brink of a new era 
in multilateralism: one where the states have 
now rolled out a global agenda with measura-
ble goals and where states have agreed upon 
involving the S&T community in both achieving 
and monitoring the global goals. This is Multi-
lateralism 2.0 in action! But this is not to say 
that scientists are going to rule the world (or 
that this would be desirable). The Multilatera-
lism 1.0 system is still in place, which means 
that states are still very much in control of 
the decision-making processes and that they 
continue to measure anything that is propo-
sed against their self-interests.
This poses several challenges for the S&T 
community. Amongst them is the delicate is-
sue of how to translate research results into 
(global) policy. This is not only a matter of im-
pact, it is also a matter of power politics within 
the S&T community. Scientific results are sel-
dom straightforward and the whole process of 
scientific progress is driven by debates and 
competing paradigms. This makes influencing 
the policy-making realm no easy task. Just 
doing the necessary research is not enough. 
Results need to be disseminated and trans-
lated in consensus through interactions with 
policy-makers. This is not only difficult and 
time consuming; it also puts scientists in a 
position for which they were not trained. And 
finally, we should not forget that states are 
not only in control of the multilateral system, 
to a large extent they also control the national 
S&T systems through their funding policies for 
research. 
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The aforementioned processes for the institu-
tionalisation of S&T input in global policy can 
be related to a broader evolving relationship 
between science and diplomacy. In principle 
the realms of science and diplomacy can be 
regarded as two distinct spheres of human 
activity that have little in common. As one 
scholar once put it: science and diplomacy 
are not obvious bedfellows. But nevertheless, 
scientific networks and scientific evidence are 
playing an increasingly important role in di-
plomacy efforts initiated by both states and 
non-state actors. We can call this practice 
“science diplomacy”. This is a relatively new 
concept, but it refers to an old practice, as 
scientists always have been at the forefront of 
international collaboration. As early as 1723, 
the UK Royal Society instituted the post of Fo-
reign Secretary. And today scientists all over 
the world are connected to each other through 
“invisible colleges”, that is, networks organi-
sed around scientific disciplines or problems. 
However, the ascent of science diplomacy is 
also related to what is labelled as the ‘soft 
power’ of states. This concept of soft power 
has been mainstreamed in International Rela-
tions Theory, but it is not always clear what 
exactly is meant by it. Nye (2004) has tried 
to provide some theoretical clarity by contrast-
ing soft power to the hard power of military 
forces and economic resources. But he then 
describes soft power as “the ability to shape 
the preferences of others” (Nye, 2004,1). La-
ter, he refined his definition into “the ability to 
affect others through the co-optive means of 
framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting 
positive attraction in order to obtain preferred 
outcomes” (Nye, 2011, pp. 20-21). Soft power 
is according to Nye partly controlled by states, 
as it is reflected in political values and foreign 
policies, but it also escapes state control as it 
also implies culture in general. Therefore, there 
are two dimensions to soft power: an essen-
tially interest-driven governmental practice and 
a value-driven practice by non-state actors. 
In recent years, S&T have become increa-
singly perceived as potential instruments for 
soft power policies. Advocates of science di-
plomacy argue that science can achieve goals 
that are in line with national interests. First, 
it is often said that the “invisible colleges” of 
scientists across state-borders can contribute 
to building trust between nations or cultures. 
Secondly, it is also argued that the language 
of science can contribute to discovering tech-
nical solutions to political problems. One can 
thus distinguish between S&T relations that 
occur without government intervention and 
science diplomacy when governmental offi-
cials try to shape and stimulate relations to 
advance national interests.3
Three varieties of science diplomacy
It is not exactly clear when the concept of 
science diplomacy was coined and first used, 
but today it is becoming widely used by policy-
makers, scientists and scholars of internatio-
nal relations. Turekian et al (2012, p. 4) de-
fines science diplomacy as “the process by 
which states represent themselves and their 
interests in the international arena when it 
comes to areas of knowledge - their acquisi-
tion, utilisation and communication - acquired 
by the scientific method”. Through the availa-
ble definition we can see a consensus that it 
makes sense to see science diplomacy as “a 
recognisable and legitimate form of diploma-
cy” (Davis and Patman, 2015, p. 261).
In 2010 the U.K. Royal Society and the 
American Association for the Advancement of 
Science (AAAS) published a landmark report 
in which they distinguished between three 
forms of science diplomacy: diplomacy for 
science, science in diplomacy and science for 
diplomacy.
Diplomacy for science is mainly about the 
facilitation of international scientific collabora-
tion. Here, classical tools of diplomacy are put 
3. See Arndt (2006) for the introduction of distinc-
tion when discussing cultural diplomacy. 
18 Focirpensament
3. Mobilising for a new science diplomacy
to use to support the scientific and technolo-
gical community. It is about using diplomacy 
in order to establish cooperation agreements 
at government or institutional level. The goal 
of diplomacy for science actions is to benefit 
from foreign S&T capacity in order to improve 
the national capacity.
With Science in Diplomacy the roles are 
reversed: here the scientists are prompted 
towards supporting foreign policy. In times of 
war this has resulted in mobilising national 
scientific and technological resources for the 
development of arms. In times of peace this 
is about using scientific knowledge in foreign 
policy decisions. The goal of such activities is 
to improve foreign policy actions through the 
use of scientific knowledge. 
Science for diplomacy goes one step fur-
ther: here science is used as a tool to build 
and improve relations between states. This 
can be done when there are tensions in rela-
tions between certain states or when states 
are faced with common problems that they 
cannot solve on their own. Scientific collabo-
ration is used here to provide collaborative 
relationships that are based upon a non-
ideological basis. The goal is here to support 
foreign policy actions by mobilising scientific 
networks.
This triple approach to science diplomacy 
has been neatly summarised by Davis and 
Putman (2015, p. 262) as follows: “Diplomats 
need to be guided by science to deal with the 
pressing issues of the day (science for diplo-
macy); the way for science often needs to be 
leavened by diplomats (diplomacy for science); 
and sometimes diplomats can use science for 
other ends (science in diplomacy)”.
Within these three broad categories of 
science diplomacy, many different science di-
plomacy practices exist. Such practices can 
emerge spontaneously, but more often they 
will be the result of deliberate policies and/
or support schemes with the involvement 
of some governmental agencies. The most 
important available governmental tools and 
instruments that can be used in promoting 
or supporting science diplomacy are strategic 
tools, operational tools and support tools.
Strategic tools are governmental com-
munications that set out policies for science 
diplomacy. Such documents can contain ge-
neral ‘visions’ of what a government aims to 
achieve or it can be more specific strategy de-
clarations issued by the government or a go-
vernmental department, such as a ministry of 
science and technology policy or a department 
of foreign affairs. Moreover, in principle it is 
possible that such strategic documents also 
occur at the level of subnational entities with 
governance responsibilities in either S&T po-
licy or foreign relations. And of course, semi-
governmental institutions such as research 
foundations or academies can issue strategic 
documents with a science diplomacy perspec-
tive as well.
Furthermore, there are many different ope-
rational tools to put science diplomacy into 
action. A first important category is the bila-
teral or multilateral S&T cooperation agree-
ments between two or more states. Many of 
these agreements focus on mobility schemes 
between the counties involved or upon joint 
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projects. A special case of such agreements 
are the ones that are foreseen in the creation 
of joint international S&T institutions by two or 
more states. A second category, dealing with 
‘science in diplomacy’ are the S&T advisory 
boards at state level. These advice systems 
can take the form of a council or high-level 
group. They can be installed at the level of 
the prime minister or be related to the de-
partment of foreign affairs or the ministry for 
science and technology. In principle such bo-
dies can also be institutionalised, as an S&T 
office within a department of foreign affairs, 
for example. In all cases the purpose is to 
Finally there are so-called support tools 
for science diplomacy that aim to promote or 
facilitate science diplomacy activities. These 
tools include training and awareness building 
activities regarding science diplomacy where 
the audiences can be either diplomats or 
scientists.
States and scientists as science
diplomacy actors
In general science diplomacy can thus be re-
garded as an instrument that can be used by 
states that use science and scientists as ins-
truments to pursue their foreign policy goals. 
This can be done in order to promote their na-
tional interests or to help solve problems that 
the states are involved in. However, scientists 
themselves can also embark upon science di-
plomacy activities without states being directly 
involved. They can intentionally act on existing 
diplomatic goals or what they do may have inten-
ded or un-intended diplomatic effects. There- 
fore, science diplomacy is a concept used in 
either labelling on-going activities as being of 
a diplomatic nature or as a label used to qua-
lify certain policy actions in a certain way. In 
other words, science diplomacy can refer to 
both practices and discourses. 
There are several interesting cases of the 
state-driven mobilisation of scientific commu-
nities for science diplomacy. A classic case is 
the scientific cooperation between the US and 
the USSR during the Cold War. And when in 
1954 the European Organisation for Nuclear 
Research (CERN) was established in Europe it 
became an arena where France and Germany 
could work together. The most recent example 
of a successful science diplomacy initiative is 
the nuclear agreement between the US and 
Iran.
Today, a major promoter of science diplo-
macy is the American Academy for the Advan-
cement of Science (AAAS), as is the Royal 
Society of the United Kingdom. In 2008 the 
AAAS created a Centre for science diploma-
cy and in 2012 it launched an open source 
journal called “Science and Diplomacy”. Also 
in the US a ‘science envoy programme’ was 
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inject scientific knowledge into state gover-
nance. A third category is the S&T advisors 
attached to embassies where the objective 
is to assist the national diplomatic mission 
in establishing cooperation with the scientists 
of the country where the embassy is located. 
Fourthly, there is the opening of national or 
regional research funding schemes to third-
party researchers. This can take the form of 
financial support of individual fellowships or 
staff exchange programmes, financial support 
for specific cross-border S&T cooperation pro-
grammes or joint calls for S&T projects issued 
by two or more states.
initiated in 2009 by the Obama administra-
tion. Several other states now have their own 
science diplomacy programmes. And even if 
no national science diplomacy programme is 
available, many states have long had scienti-
fic attachés in their embassies. An interesting 
case is Spain, where the Spanish Foundation 
for Science and Technology has recently ap-
pointed three international coordinators to its 
embassies in London, Washington and Berlin. 
They operate as offices for the cultural and 
scientific affairs of the Embassies of Spain. 
In Europe, the EU also pays increasingly atten-
tion to science diplomacy as part of its foreign 
policy, although the driving force comes from 
its Directorate General for Research, not from 
its European External Action Services. But 
science diplomacy is increasingly on the EU 
agenda, since Carlos Moedas, the EU Com-
missioner for Research, Science and Innova-
tion in a speech delivered at the European Ins-
titute in Washington on 1st June 2015, boldly 
stated that he wants “science diplomacy to 
play a leading role in our global outreach for 
its uniting power”.4 In that same speech, he 
compared science diplomacy to a torch that 
can “light the way, where other kinds of poli-
tics and diplomacy have failed”.
The aforementioned institutionalisation of 
a broad science-policy nexus at a global le-
vel has in recent years resulted in a growing 
awareness and willingness of S&T organisa-
tions and S&T funding agencies to be part of 
this new development. As such, networks of 
S&T communities and policy-makers at natio-
nal and global level are dramatically expanding. 
Some of them are initiated by policy-makers, 
others by scientists themselves. Below is a 
short overview of some of these networked 
organisations that are playing a major role in 
how S&T relate to policy-making concerning 
global problems. 
The Inter Academy Council (IAC) was esta-
blished in 2000 by science academies from all 
4. Moedas, C. The EU approach to science diploma-
cy. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/
moedas/announcements/eu-approach-science-di-
plomacy_en 
over the world with the purpose of facilitating 
the provision of advice and recommendations 
on issues of global and regional importance 
for international organisations, multilateral 
organisations and national governments. The 
IAC has instituted several expert panels that 
conduct comprehensive reports that touch 
upon science, technology and health. Based 
in Amsterdam, the IAC receives its basic fun-
ding from the Royal Netherlands Academy of 
Arts and Sciences. In 2010 the UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon requested the IAC to 
conduct an independent review of the IPCC. 
The Group on Earth Observation (GEO) was 
established in 2005 and renewed in 2014 for 
another 10-year period. The GEO is an intergo-
vernmental organisation that brings together 
major actors in global Earth observation and 
whose decisions are taken by consensus in 
a plenary session including representatives 
from 98 states and the European Commis-
sion as well as representatives from around 
90 international organisations with a remit in 
earth science. The GEO plays a major role in 
the follow up of SDGs.
The Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) 
and the Green Growth Knowledge Platform 
(GGPK) are two initiatives established con-
cerning the development of a so-called green 
economy. The GGKP, which has a membership 
that includes the OECD, the UNEP and the World 
Bank, is both a knowledge exchange and learn-
ing initiative as a funding structure. The GGGI is 
a Korea-based international organisation set up 
to promote the green growth agenda.
The Sustainable Development Solutions 
Network (SDSN) is a global network initiated 
by Jeffrey Sachs of Columbia University. It was 
launched in 2012 under the auspices of the 
UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon, but re-
mains independent of the UN system. 
The Belmont Forum was created in 2009 
and represents a group of the world’s major 
funders of global environmental change re-
search. The aim of the Belmont Forum is to 
accelerate the delivery of the environmental 
research needed to remove critical barriers 
to sustainability by aligning and mobilising 
international resources. As one of its major 
activities, the Belmont Forum launches Colla-
Focirpensament 21
borative Research Actions (CRAs) on specific 
themes that are agreed upon collectively. The 
funding, however, is the responsibility of the 
various participating agencies.
Future Earth was launched at the Rio+20 
Summit following the promotion by the Science 
and Technology Alliance for Global Sustainabi-
lity. This Alliance is composed of the ISCU, the 
ISSC, the UNEP, the United Nations University 
(UNU), the WMO and the Belmont Forum.
Future Earth forms a global platform for 
scientific collaboration on global change re-
search and sustainability around diverse key 
challenges, namely: 
· Deliver water, energy, and food for all, 
and manage the synergies and trade-offs 
among them, by understanding how these 
interactions are shaped by environmental, 
economic, social and political changes. 
· Decarbonise socio-economic systems to 
stabilise the climate by promoting the tech-
nological, economic, social, political and 
behavioural changes enabling transforma-
tions, while building knowledge about the 
impacts of climate change and adaptation 
responses for people and ecosystems. 
· Safeguard the terrestrial, freshwater and 
marine natural assets underpinning human 
well-being by understanding relationships 
between biodiversity, ecosystem functio-
ning and services, and developing effecti-
ve valuation and governance approaches. 
· Build healthy, resilient and productive ci-
ties by identifying and shaping innovations 
that combine better urban environments 
and lives with declining resource footprints, 
and provide efficient services and infras-
tructures that are robust to disasters. 
· Promote sustainable rural futures to 
feed rising and more affluent populations 
amidst changes in biodiversity, resources 
and climate by analysing alternative land 
uses, food systems and ecosystem op-
tions, and identifying institutional and go-
vernance needs. 
· Improve human health by elucidating and 
finding responses to, the complex inte-
ractions amongst environmental change, 
pollution, pathogens, disease vectors, 
ecosystem services, and people’s liveli-
hoods, nutrition and well-being. 
· Encourage sustainable consumption and 
production patterns that are equitable by 
understanding the social and environmen-
tal impacts of consumption of all resour-
ces, opportunities for decoupling resource 
use from growth in well-being, and options 
for sustainable development pathways and 
related changes in human behaviour. 
· Increase social resilience to future threats 
by building adaptive governance systems, 
developing early warning of global and con-
nected thresholds and risks, and testing 
effective, accountable and transparent ins-
titutions that promote transformations to 
sustainability. 
It is a 10-year programme that brings toge-
ther existing global environmental change pro-
grammes and incorporates the outcomes of 
recent planning and agenda-setting processes 
led by the Alliance members.
The aforementioned cases illustrate that 
mobilising the S&T community to deal with 
today’s global problems is thus a complex 
matter. It is not only a matter of doing the re-
search. Equally important is the translation 
into useable knowledge and the organisation 
of dialogue with the policy-making realm. This 
is where science diplomacy comes in as a 
tool to streamline and professionalise the re-
lations between the S&T community and the 
multilateral system.
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The recent trend to step up scientific diplo-
macy activities in different parts of the world 
is an interesting one to monitor. It poses the 
question, for what purposes will states and 
scientists work together? States have their 
own reasons, namely the pursuit of their self-
interests. But scientists are putting other is-
sues on the table and this might be changing 
the practices of science diplomacy. Perhaps 
the most salient development for the future 
of science diplomacy is indeed the growing 
awareness of global problems that sovereign 
states are faced with. They are not only all 
global in nature; they are also all connected 
to scientific and technological issues both in 
order to monitor them and to find solutions 
to them. Almost all of today’s pressing global 
problems such as climate change or energy se-
curity have a scientific component. Hence the 
need to link global governance with scientific 
evidence. This is exactly what Agenda 2020 
foresees. For the sustainable development 
goals to be reached, different actors need to 
do their part: governments, the private sector, 
civil society and also the scientific communi-
ties. Science diplomacy might therefore be 
just the tool we need to realise these goals.
In conclusion, we can say that the UN and 
the S&T community have already embarked 
upon an increased involvement of S&T in glo-
bal policy making. This is not only bringing 
hope for better global policy-making in order to 
tackle today’s serious global problems, it also 
contributes to a change-process of the multi-
lateral system itself. But the result is also an 
increasingly complex global governance struc-
ture where scientists and policy-makers can 
interact. These interactions are not without 
problems, as both states and the scientific 
communities have their own interests and 
speak a different language. Bringing S&T to 
the global policy realm is therefore not a sim-
ple endeavour and in order to be effective it 
needs to be further professionalised and deve-
loped as a practice. This can be done through 
moving science diplomacy away from the soft 
power rhetoric and self-interests of states 
towards a global level where it can be used 
as a tool to achieve better global governance. 
Inspired by the triple approach to science di-
plomacy at a national level, one can therefore 
see three areas where such a global science 
diplomacy effort can be further developed.
The first area is that of science in global 
diplomacy. As most of the S&T community 
is for obvious reasons primarily interested 
in doing research, and not necessarily in di-
plomatic actions, the issue is how to bring 
all relevant issues to the right places. While 
not all scientists need to engage in science 
diplomacy directly, there should at least be a 
general understanding amongst all of them on 
the mechanisms of science advice at a global 
level. And for those scientists who do act as 
science diplomats, awareness and skills are 
needed regarding the processes of interacting 
with diplomats and policy-makers.
A second area is that of diplomacy for 
global science. Here we are talking about 
diplomatic actions at the level of multilateral 
organisations aimed at facilitating S&T colla-
borations in the context of dealing with global 
problems. At a multilateral level this mainly 
involves the opening up of the policy realms 
to S&T advice. States could do the same, but 
meanwhile they also have to open up their na-
tional funding schemes in order to fund the re-
quired research. Furthermore, diplomats and 
policy-makers at both state and multilateral 
level need more awareness and skills on how 
to engage with the S&T community.
A third area can be labelled global science 
for global diplomacy. The S&T community is 
not only organised into disciplinary and epis-
temic communities but also in advocacy net-
works. These organisations are at the nexus 
of global science-policy interactions and need 
funding for the support structures in order to 
deliver S&T advice at a global level. Helping 
to support not only the relevant research but 
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also the much-needed international organisa-
tions for partnering using the multilateral sys-
tem, can be seen as a major responsibility of 
states.
Together, these three areas can be regar-
ded as the building blocks of a global scien-
ce diplomacy programme or agenda. Further 
developing such an agenda could be a joint 
effort of the S&T organisations such as the 
ICSU or the ISSC, S&T funding agencies and 
global organisations. The stakes are high, as 
dealing with global problems such as clima-
te change are major challenges for humanity. 
This paper has pointed to a number of develop- 
ments that bear the promise of making the glo-
bal governance of such problems more feasi-
ble. Amongst them are the opening up of the 
multilateral system to S&T input that goes well 
beyond the passive practice of science advi-
ce as well as the introduction of measurable 
and monitorable global governance goals. Ob-
viously, this does not mean that we can expect 
that scientists will save the world, or that sta-
tes will (or even should) hand over their so-
vereign powers to scientists. But multilateral 
policy-makers badly need S&T input in order 
to understand the problems and challenges, 
to draft effective policies, to monitor what 
is happening and to develop innovative solu-
tions. This means not only that scientists and 
diplomats need to step up their interactions in 
the context of the Multilateral Mode 2.0 envi-
ronment. It also means that states, regions, 
NGOs as well as the S&T community all need 
to take actions to further their progress their 
dialogue and collaboration. Developing a glo-
bal science diplomacy agenda should there-
fore be a priority for all those concerned for 
the sustainable future of the planet and its 
present and future inhabitants. A first step 
towards such a global science diplomacy 
initiative could be the drafting of a strategic 
document that outlines a vision on how S&T 
could be best integrated into the tackling of 
global challenges. Such a vision could then 
be operationalised in tools that deal with both 
the complexities of formulating often disputed 
scientific advice and the complexities of global 
policy-making. The big question then is: who is 
willing and capable to take the lead in such an 
initiative? Perhaps the answer is: a coalition 
of S&T organisations, major funding agencies 
and multilateral organisations. After all, global 
challenges deserve global solutions.
24 Focirpensament
States, regions, NGOs as well as
the S&T community all need to
take actions to further their
dialogue and collaboration.
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